State of Utah v. Mark Stephen Merila : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Mark Stephen Merila : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Barnard N. Madsen; Assiistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State of Utah v. Merila, No. 970107 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/687
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK STEPHEN MERILA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970107-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for absconding from 
parole supervision, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1996), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES, #54 97 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 




K - U 
50 
FILED 
m 15 HTM 
JyKaD'Atesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK STEPHEN MERILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970107-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for absconding from 
parole supervision, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) (1996), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
LINDA M. JONES, #5497 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 E. 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor 
P. O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE STATE CANNOT POINT TO EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING A CHANGE IN RESIDENCE. 1 
A. THE STATE HAS DISTORTED THE FACTS OF 
RECORD. 1 
B. TO JUSTIFY APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN 
THIS CASE, THE STATE DISREGARDS THE BASIC 
TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE 
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ABSCONDING STATUTE. . 4 
C. THE STATE LOOKS TO MERILA'S PAROLE 
AGREEMENT AND INAPPLICABLE CASE LAW TO 
CONSTRUE SUBSECTION (2). 7 
POINT II. THE STATE DISREGARDS PRECEDENT THAT 
REQUIRES TRIAL COURTS TO USE CAUTION IN ADMITTING 
"FLIGHT" INTO EVIDENCE. 12 
A. THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE WAS PROPERLY 
PRESERVED 13 
B. THE STATE MISUNDERSTANDS THE CONCEPT OF 
AN "INNOCENT" STATE OF MIND AS IT RELATES TO 
THE CHARGED OFFENSE. 15 
C. THE STATE ARGUES THAT WHERE FLIGHT 
EVIDENCE IS RELEVANT. DEFENDANT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS. HOWEVER, 
UTAH COURTS PROVIDE THAT IF FLIGHT EVIDENCE 
IS RELEVANT AND ADMITTED, IT MUST BE 
ACCOMPANIED BY CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS. . . 16 
D. THE STATE RELIES ON AN INAPPLICABLE RULE 
TO ASSERT THAT IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR 
THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO GIVE THE LIMITING 
INSTRUCTIONS AS DICTATED BY THE COURTS IN 
BALES. FRANKLIN, HOWLAND AND FISHER. . . . . 18 
POINT III. THE STATE RELIES ON ITS MISSTATED 
FACTS TO ARGUE THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS WERE 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 20 
POINT IV. THE STATE RELIES ON EARLIER, FLAWED 
ARGUMENTS IN RESPONDING TO THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE CLAIMS. 
A. THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT IN 
CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
CONCLUSION 
Addendum A: Transcript pages R. 128:41-43, 46, 51, 56-57, 
Addendum B: Transcript pages R. 128:45, 70, 72-73 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) . . . 12, 17, 18, 
19 
GEICO v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982) 9 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972) 11 
Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816 (Utah 1991) . . . . 11 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) 11 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) 11 
State in the Interest of A.B.. 936 P.2d 1091 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 
(Utah 1997) 5 
State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983) 12, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 
23, 24 
State v. Belaard, 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992) 15 
State v. Crawford. 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030 
(1921) 15, 16, 23 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) 21 
State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987) . . . 12, 16, 17, 
18, 19 
State v. Graham, 665 A.2d 769 (N.J. Super 
Ct. App. Div. 1995) 10 
State v. Haaa, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 
App. 1998) 25 
State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 




State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), 
abrogated by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 
484 (Utah 1997) 18 
State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) 15 
State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993), 
cert, denied. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993) 21 
State v. Pearson. 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997) 25 
State v. Redd. 33 7 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah App. 
1998) 5, 11 
State v. Rocco. 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1990) 18 
State v. Smith. 700 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) 18 
State v. Valdez. 432 P.2d 53 (Utah 1967) 18 
U.S. v. Onick. 889 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1989) 9 
U.S. v. Wilson. 107 F.3d 774 (10th Cir. 1997) 9 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202 (Supp. 1997) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5 (Supp. 1997) 4, 5, 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-6(1) (Supp. 1997) 13 
Utah R. Evid. 105 (1998) 18 
Utah R. Evid. 402 (1998) 16 
Utah R. Evid. 404 (1998) 18 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 11 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 11 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK STEPHEN MERILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970107-CA 
Priority No. 2 
POINT I. THE STATE CANNOT POINT TO EVIDENCE SUPPORTING A 
CHANGE IN RESIDENCE, 
A. THE STATE HAS DISTORTED THE FACTS OF RECORD. 
In the statement of facts and argument portion of its brief, 
the state claims the following facts support a conviction against 
Appellant Mark Merila for willfully changing his residence: 
[1] Defendant failed to return to his reported residence by 
his 9:00 p.m. curfew on 3 June 1996 (R. 128:31 [sic:32]). 
[2] When his parole officer went to the house early the next 
morning, 4 June 1996, no one came to the door (R. 128:32-
33). [3] When agents went to the house several times later 
that day, including at 10:30 p.m., defendant was not there 
(R. 128:37). [4] Defendant did not respond to his parole 
officer's telephone call, and [5] he was not at the house 
when agents looked for him several times, including after 
10:00 p.m., on 5 June 1996 (R. 128:33-34, 36). 
(State's Brief at 14-15; 5-7.) The state has distorted facts. 
With respect to facts [2] and [4], Agent Paul Truelson 
testified that when he learned that Merila arrived home early in 
the morning on June 4th, Truelson "made an effort to contact 
[Merila] at the home about 7:30." (R. 128:32.) 
On cross-examination, Truelson clarified that the "effort" 
involved making a telephone call. He telephoned Merila's home at 
7:45 a.m. in response to Merila's message at 7:17 a.m. that 
Merila would be out looking for a job. (R. 128:3 8.) Contrary to 
the state's fact [2], Truelson specifically did not visit the 
home that day. (R. 128:37.) 
Regarding fact [4], the state asserts Merila did not respond 
to Truelson's call. That is misleading. The evidence fails to 
support that Truelson left a message requesting a response or 
further attempted to telephone Merila. (R. 128:28-40.) 
With respect to fact [3], the state suggests that because 
Merila was not home "several times" during the day when agents 
were there, his absence constituted a violation of parole. Yet, 
according to the record, Truelson received a telephone message at 
7:17 a.m. from Merila that he would be looking for a job. In 
addition, his curfew was not until 9:00 p.m. Any suggestion that 
Merila was required to be home at all hours when electronic 
monitoring agents were at the house is incorrect. 
Fact [5] is misleading since Truelson and his partner, Agent 
Collard, were the only agents who went to the home on June 5th 
specifically to contact Merila. (R. 128:33-34.)1 They were at 
the house for 10 minutes at 9:45 p.m. and observed that Merila's 
belongings were there. (R. 128:34, 38-39.) Truelson testified 
that electronic monitoring agents had also been at the home. 
However, there is no indication that they were there to "look" 
for Merila as represented by the state. Rather, they "went out 
and obtained the box, the electronic unit." (R. 128:33.) 
The state also asserts that while "Defendant's girlfriend 
1
 Truelson was the only officer to testify that he made any 
effort to visit the home during the relevant time period. (See 
trial transcript in general, R. 128.) 
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... knew there was a warrant for defendant's arrest, and knew 
that she was supposed to report any information about his 
whereabouts ... she never reported to authorities that defendant 
was still residing at her house." (State's Brief at 7.) That is 
incorrect. Agent Harvey Vankatwyk testified that he talked to 
Merila's fiance, Jodean Johnson, shortly after June 5th. Johnson 
confirmed that Merila lived at the residence. (R. 128: 44-45, 
72-73.) Johnson's testimony is not in conflict with Vankatwyk's 
statements. (R. 128: 66-67; 128:70-71.) 
The state finally asserts that Merila's "location was 
unknown to authorities until his arrest on 24 June 1996 (R. 128: 
41-43, 46, 51, 56-57, 62)." (State's Brief at 15.) Merila has 
attached hereto as Addendum A those pages cited by the state. 
They fail to support the assertion.2 Rather, the state's 
evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 
Vankatwyk testified that he had information concerning 
Merila's whereabouts during the relevant time period. He stated 
that shortly after June 5th, he spoke with Johnson. He was 
concerned for her safety because at the time, Merila was living 
with her and had a felony warrant out for his arrest. (R. 128:45; 
2
 The transcript pages do not suggest that Merila's location 
was unknown from June 3rd to June 24th. Rather, those pages concern 
the "chase" that occurred on June 24th. 
In addition, at page 41, Harvey Vankatwyk testified that on 
June 23rd, he learned from Johnson's mother that Merila would be 
picking Johnson up from work the next day. Vankatwyk testified 
that as of June 23rd, to his "knowledge, we were attempting to find 
[Merila] ." (R. 128:41.) Again, that testimony does not support that 
Merila's location was "unknown" from June 3rd to June 24th, or that 
Merila had changed his residence. 
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128:72-73; see also 128:44 (Vankatwyk knew that Merila and 
Johnson were living together) .) 
Vankatwyk also testified that during their conversation, 
Johnson confirmed that she and Merila were still living together. 
She told Vankatwyk that Merila came home occasionally at odd 
hours in the early morning, but that he was living with her. (R. 
128:45, 72-73.)3 Vankatwyk's testimony reflects that officers 
had information that Merila was living at the residence between 
June 3rd and 24th. For whatever reason, officers did not act on 
that information. 
Even if this Court adopts the state's rendition of the 
facts, the evidence supports only that Merila failed to report to 
his parole officer during the month of June, and he violated 
curfew on June 3rd, 4th, and 5th. The evidence does not support a 
conviction for "willfully chang[ing one's] residence," as charged 
here. See Utah Code Ann. 76-8-309.5(2) (Supp. 1997). 
B. TO JUSTIFY APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN THIS CASE, THE 
STATE DISREGARDS THE BASIC TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
AND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ABSCONDING STATUTE. 
3
 The state claims Johnson and Vankatwyk provided conflicting 
testimony on that point, where one of them apparently testified 
that Merila "had stayed at [Johnson's] house, visiting late at 
night for a couple of hours (R. 128: 45, 72-73; cf. 128: 70)." 
(State's Brief at 16-17.) Merila has attached hereto as Addendum B 
those record pages cited by the state. They reflect that Johnson 
told Vankatwyk "that [Merila] was staying with me at night, that he 
was still at home." [Prosecutor]: "That he was still there?" 
[Johnson]: "Yes." [Prosecutor]: "Are you sure?" [Johnson]: "I'm 
positive." (R. 128:70.) Vankatwyk testified that when he spoke 
with Johnson she stated: "'He stays here but he doesn't come until 
late at night,'and I thought that the time was mentioned like two, 
around two in the morning." (R. 128:72-73.) The testimony is not 
conflicting. In addition, neither Johnson nor Vankatwyk charac-
terized Merila as "visiting late at night for a couple of hours." 
4 
The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
a conviction against Merila under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(2) 
("Subsection (2)") for "willfully chang[ing his] residence." 
In opposition to Merila's sufficiency challenge, the state 
does not assert the evidence supports that Merila "change[d his] 
residence."4 Rather, the state claims such evidence is not 
necessary to sustain a conviction under Subsection (2). According 
to the state, the legislature intended the statute to apply when 
a parolee allegedly has avoided parole by being "absent from the 
residence." (State's Brief at 13 (emphasis in original).) 
The state's interpretation of the statute's application is 
not based in principles of statutory construction. The state 
characterizes reliance upon dictionary definitions as "strained 
construction." (State's Brief at 11.) Yet, this Court has 
recognized that when "a statute fails to define a word, 'we rely 
on the dictionary to divine the "usual meaning."'" State v. 
Redd, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (Utah App. 1998) (cites omitted); 
(see also Brief of Appellant at 11-14.) 
The state also ignores reading Subsection (2) to harmonize 
with related provisions. State in the Interest of A.B., 936 P.2d 
1091, 1097 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). 
Yet, related provisions shed light on construing Subsection 
(2), where the legislature has distinguished between certain 
4
 Indeed, according to state witnesses, Merila's belongings 
were at the home when agents searched the residence, and agents 
testified that according to information available to them, Merila 
returned to the residence at night, sometimes at odd hours. (See R. 
128:34; 128:38; 128:45-46; 128:70-73.) 
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parole violations. For example, when a parolee has "absent[ed]" 
himself from the state, he has violated parole, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-202 (Supp. 1997); he commits a separate offense and a 
violation when he "leaves" a governmental residential facility 
without permission, or "fails to [timely] return" to that 
facility. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(1), (4) (Supp. 1997). Each 
violation is distinct, and each violation results in the parolee 
avoiding supervision and absenting himself from a residence. 
Under the state's interpretation, mere proof that Merila was 
"absent from the residence" is sufficient to establish a willful 
"change [ of] residence." That interpretation improperly supplants 
specific legislative language with a general proposition. 
If the legislature had intended mere absence to constitute a 
crime, it was capable of patterning the language of Subsection 
(2) after Section 76-3-202 and making it a separate offense for a 
parolee to "absent himself." 
Likewise, if the legislature had intended the conduct in 
this case to constitute a separate offense without a showing that 
defendant ate, slept, lived somewhere else, the legislature was 
capable of patterning the language of Subsection (2) after Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5(1) and making it a crime for a parolee to 
"leave []" his residence without permission, or to "fail[] to 
return at a prescribed time." The fact that the legislature did 
not draft Subsection (2) in those terms fairly implies that it 
intended the state to prove a willful change of residence to 
support a conviction. 
S 
Since the legislature used specific language to define the 
offense at Subsection (2), it intended the phrase, "willfully 
changes the residence", to have meaning. It intended the statute 
to apply in the limited circumstances set forth in the provision. 
C. THE STATE LOOKS TO MERILA'S PAROLE AGREEMENT AND 
INAPPLICABLE CASE LAW TO CONSTRUE SUBSECTION (2). 
The state relies on the parole agreement between Merila and 
the state to construe application of Subsection (2). The state 
asserts the agreement contains important reasons for requiring a 
parolee to maintain his reported residence. 
[A]s a condition of parole, defendant agreed (1) to "permit 
visits to my place of residence by agents of Adult Probation 
and Parole..." (2) to "permit agents of [AP & P] to search 
my person, residence, vehicle, [etc.] at any time, day or 
night,..." and (3) to be subject to electronic monitoring 
and have a unit installed at his reported residence... 
(State's Brief at 12-13.) Merila does not dispute the importance 
of those provisions. Contrary to the state's claims, the 
provisions further illustrate that the evidence in this case was 
insufficient. 
So long as a parolee's place of residence remains unchanged, 
agents are not prevented from visiting and searching the 
residence "at any time, day or night," or monitoring parolee as 
provided by the agreement.5 The agreement contemplates that 
when a parolee fails to report to the residence at a prescribed 
time, but returns at odd hours, agents still have permission and 
5
 The state does not assert, and the evidence does not 
support, that the state was unable to electronically monitor Merila 
because he "change[d]" his "residence." Rather the state asserts 
agents removed the monitoring equipment because "defendant had 
disabled or removed his ankle bracelet." (State's Brief at 6.) 
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the ability to visit and search the residence "at any time, day 
or night." According to Vankatwyk, such a visit would have been 
productive since Merila "stay[ed at home,] but [on occasion] he 
[did not] come [home] until late at night." (R. 128:73.) 
In addition, to the extent the agreement actually sheds 
light on legislative intent, the maxim "expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius" may apply. The agreement details 3 separate 
events as absconding. Under the absconding provision, the 
parolee acknowledges he will abide by the following conditions: 
A. Reporting: I will report as directed by the Department 
of Corrections. 
B. Residence: I will establish and reside at a residence 
of record and will not change my residence without first 
obtaining permission from my parole agent. 
C. Leaving the State: I will not leave my state of 
residence, even briefly, or any other state to which I am 
released or transferred without prior written permission 
from my parole agent. 
(State's Exhibit 2 (emphasis added); R. 128: 29-30.) 
Reconciling the parole agreement and Subsection (2) is easy. 
Section B specifies that changing one's residence constitutes a 
violation of parole. That is also a separate offense under 
Subsection (2). Violations of other provisions in the agreement 
do not constitute a separate offense. The agreement supports the 
determination that failing to report (as established in Merila's 
case) and changing one's residence are two separate acts. 
The state also suggests that the Court should adopt factors 
relating to "residence" as set forth in the "insurance context." 
The state claims that "willfully chang[ing one's] residence" is 
determined after review of the following considerations: 
$ 
[1 T]he individual's physical presence or absence from the 
household, [2] the relationship of the individual to the 
[owner, 3] the circumstances surrounding the person's pre-
sence or absence from the [owner's] home, [4] prior living 
arrangements of the individual, and [5] the individual's in-
tentions at various times regarding his place of residence. 
(State's Brief at 14 n.7 (citing GEICO v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 
676 n.2 (Utah 1982)).)6 
With respect to insurance factor [1], Merila's belongings 
were at the house and Merila stayed there, supporting that Merila 
maintained a physical presence at the residence. See U.S. v. 
Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 779 (10th Cir. 1997) (defendant's personal 
belongings in home demonstrated that he lived there); U.S. v. 
Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1430 (5th Cir. 1989) (defendant's clothing 
at house supported determination that he lived there). 
With regard to factor [2], Merila lived with his fiance. 
Although the state offered no evidence concerning home ownership, 
the living arrangements and relationship support residence. The 
state presented no evidence disavowing the relationship. 
With respect to factor [3], Truelson testified that Merila 
was absent from home on at least one occasion because he was 
looking for a job. To the extent evidence supports that Merila 
was absent to avoid supervision, as set forth above, that may 
constitute a violation of parole, but not a conviction for a 
separate crime, i.e. "willfully chang[ing] the residence." See 
6
 In the insurance context, the term "resident" "does not con-
template the permanence associated with domicile." GEICO, 645 P.2d 
at 676. That seems to be contrary to the intent of the parole 
statutes and agreement, which prohibit a parolee from changing his 
residence. Those provisions contemplate permanence at least while 
parolee is on parole. The insurance factors may not be applicable. 
9 
Point I.A. and B., supra. 
As for Merila's prior living arrangements (factor [4]), 
Merila lived at the home before he was incarcerated for the 
offenses that led to his parole in this case. The state failed to 
present evidence either proving or disproving that fact. Also, 
he was paroled in December 1995 and had been living at the 
residence since that time. (R. 128:29, 31.) 
With respect to Merila's intentions at various times (factor 
[5]), the state has offered no evidence to support that Merila 
intended to discontinue the living arrangement. Rather, the 
evidence supported the continuing nature of that arrangement: at 
the time Merila was arrested, he was involved in a task for his 
fiance --he was picking her up from work. Overall, the insurance 
factors do not support the state's case. 
The state also relies on New Jersey precedent to argue that 
mere absence from the residence constitutes an offense under the 
Utah provision. (State's Brief at 13.) In State v. Graham, 665 
A.2d 769 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), defendant was charged 
with "absconding from parole." The court ruled the offense 
consisted of two elements: (1) the act of going into hiding and 
(2) intending to avoid parole supervision, which may be 
established with prima facie evidence that parolee abandoned a 
place of residence. Id. at 770. 
The defendant in Graham acknowledged that the state present-
ed sufficient evidence to support the second element. The court 
was required only to consider whether the evidence supported 
"hiding." Id. at 771. Graham is inapposite. Utah's statute does 
10 
not make "hiding" a separate offense. 
Finally, the state does not dispute that interpreting Sub-
section (2) to apply in this case may give rise to vagueness 
concerns. (Brief of Appellant at 17-18.) That is, if alleged 
curfew and reporting violations are sufficient to constitute an 
offense under Subsection (2) , the interpretation makes the 
specific change-of-residence language meaningless, and lends 
vagueness to the statute in violation of due process provisions. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.7 
A change of residence requires proof of something more than 
violating curfew or reporting requirements. If the state is able 
to sustain a conviction with evidence that defendant generally 
avoided supervision, without more, the statute fails to give fair 
warning of the offensive conduct. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vague laws do not provide fair 
warning); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (no one may be 
required to speculate as to meaning of penal statute); Greenwood 
v. Citv of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
In enacting Subsection (2), "we ... assume the Legislature 
carefully and advisedly chose the statute's words and phrases." 
Redd, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6 (cite omitted). If the statute is 
construed as argued by the state, the interpretation will nullify 
use of the specific phrase "willfully changes the residence," and 
7
 Merila has not raised a double jeopardy argument. 
Therefore, Merila does not respond to the state's Point I.D. 
11 
leave the statute to apply in situations not otherwise 
contemplated by the specific word choice. 
The evidence fails to support that Merila actually changed 
his residence. Merila urges this Court to reverse the conviction. 
POINT II. THE STATE DISREGARDS PRECEDENT THAT REQUIRES TRIAL 
COURTS TO USE CAUTION IN ADMITTING "FLIGHT" INTO EVIDENCE. 
Merila has argued on appeal that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence concerning "flight" since the evidence was 
irrelevant. Merila also maintains that in the event this Court 
finds that the evidence was relevant here, the trial court erred 
in failing to provide cautionary instructions to the jury 
concerning flight evidence. (Brief of Appellant at Point II.)8 
In response to Merila's arguments on appeal, the state 
asserts the following: Merila did not object to the state's 
evidence of flight and thus has failed to preserve the issue for 
review on appeal; flight evidence is relevant in the context of 
8
 The state admits that appellate courts in this jurisdiction 
have recognized the prejudicial effect of "flight" evidence, and 
have mandated that such evidence be admitted with caution. (State's 
Brief at 22.) Utah courts are uniform in that directive. In State 
v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 39 (Utah 1987), evidence of flight was 
admissible. The court approved instructions that cautioned the jury 
not to give too much weight to the mere fact of flight without 
carefully considering other motives that may have influenced 
defendant. In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983), the 
court ruled that where there is ample evidence of flight, the jury 
should be informed that "there might be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt 
is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual 
guilt of the crime charged." Id.; see also State v. Howland, 761 
P.2d 579, 580 n.l (Utah App. 1988) (court should caution jury) . In 
Fisher v. Trapp, 74 8 P.2d 2 04, 2 05 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988) , this Court analyzed Franklin and Bales, 
and determined that the reasoning in those cases requires use of 
cautionary instructions where evidence of flight is admitted. 
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this case; and the trial court was not required to give limiting 
instructions. The state misconstrues Utah law, and misstates the 
record, as further set forth below. 
A. THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED. 
The state argues that Merila failed at trial to object to 
"flight" evidence as irrelevant. (State's Brief at Point II.) 
The state is incorrect. Taken in context, the record reflects 
that before the state examined witness Charles Alder about 
evidence of "flight," defense counsel objected to the 
admissibility of the evidence on relevance grounds.9 
As set forth in Merila's opening brief, Alder was the first 
9
 The state believes Merila's counsel did not intend the ob-
jection to relate to evidence of "flight" because "Defendant did 
not object" to remarks made by the prosecutor during opening state-
ments. (State's Brief at 19.) The state's argument is not rational. 
Attorneys have reasons for not objecting to opening comments made 
by opposing counsel since such comments are not evidence (see R. 
128:19). In the event counsel for Merila had been successful in 
keeping the flight evidence out at trial, during closing argument 
he could point out to jury members that the prosecutor 
misrepresented the evidence in his opening statement. (Id.) 
The state next asserts that Vankatwyk provided testimony 
concerning flight without objection. Counsel for Merila asserted 
the same thing at footnote 5 of Merila's opening brief on appeal. 
Counsel for Merila hereby acknowledges that footnote 5 of 
Merila's opening Brief of Appellant is incorrect. Vankatwyk1s 
testimony did not concern "flight." Rather, Vankatwyk testified 
that he followed Merila in a surveillance car to a Flying J 
restaurant. At the restaurant, Vankatwyk's partner, Ms. Miller, 
"exited the car, had drawn her weapon, and asked at that time --
ordered [Merila] out of the car." (R. 128:43.) Vankatwyk testified 
that he did not get out of the car or approach Merila. (R. 128:46.) 
There is no indication that Merila actually recognized Vankatwyk 
since Vankatwyk stayed in the car. Likewise, there is no support 
for the determination that Merila understood that he was being 
approached by "an arresting parole officer" (see State's Brief at 
24) since Miller never announced her purpose. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-6(1) (Supp. 1997). Vankatwyk's testimony fails to support 
the determination that Merila was fleeing from arrest. Footnote 5 
of Merila's opening brief is incorrect. 
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witness to testify in detail with respect to "flight." (R. 128: 
48-57); see note 9, supra. As pointed out by the state, Alder 
began his testimony by describing officers' observations 
immediately prior to the chase. 
The prosecutor asked, "Now, as you sat in the parking lot, 
what was the first thing that you noticed that drew your atten-
tion." (R. 128:50.) Alder testified that officers saw Johnson 
leave her place of employment. The prosecutor asked, "And after 
she came out --" At that point, the defense objected to testimony 
concerning what happened next, i.e. the evidence of "flight": 
Your Honor, if I may, I'm not sure what the relevance of the 
testimony is with respect to the charges before the Court. 
He's charged with absconding by changing his residence. I'm 
not sure where this is going in terms of relevance. 
(R. 128:50.) To the extent there was any confusion with respect 
to the subject matter of the objection, the prosecutor cleared 
that up. The judge asked the prosecutor to respond to the 
objection, which he did: "I think it relates to the defendant's 
state of mind." (R. 128:50.) The trial court overruled the 
defense's objection on that basis. (Id.) 
On appeal, the state now asserts the objection and ruling 
related not to "state of mind," but to testimony about Merila's 
"girlfriend's activities during surveillance." (State's Brief at 
21.) Even if this Court determines the objection related to the 
"girlfriend's activities," the trial court's ruling focused on 
"defendant's state of mind," i.e. the "flight" evidence. (See 
State's Brief at 23-24: state argues "evidence of defendant's 
flight ... was 'useful in determining ... state of mind.") Since 
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the judge overruled the objection on that basis (R. 128:50) the 
ruling was adequate to preserve the argument for purposes of the 
appeal. See State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). 
B. THE STATE MISUNDERSTANDS THE CONCEPT OF AN "INNOCENT" 
STATE OF MIND AS IT RELATES TO THE CHARGED OFFENSE. 
The state next argues that "it is well settled under Utah 
case law that 'evidence of flight is probative. '" (State's Brief 
at 22.) Merila does not deny that such evidence has been upheld 
as relevant in this jurisdiction. (See Brief of Appellant at 21.) 
However, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that where defendant 
may have a "guilty" conscience for more than one reason, the fact 
that he fled from agents does not indicate a guilty conscience 
with respect to the specific offense for which defendant is being 
tried. See State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983); State 
v. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201 P. 1030, 1033 (1921). 
As set forth in Merila's opening brief on appeal and as set 
forth above, Merila does not deny that at the time he was being 
pursued by officers, he had a guilty conscience. As the state 
points out, Merila "was an already-convicted felon on parole." 
(State's Brief at 24.) Parole violations carried serious 
consequences where Merila faced the possibility of serving the 
remainder of his sentence in prison for the underlying offenses. 
However, Merila did not have a guilty conscience for 
"chang[ing his] residence." Indeed, Merila did not change his 
residence -- the state is unable to identify evidence supporting 
the determination that Merila ate, slept or lived anywhere other 
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than at the residence during the relevant time period. See Point 
I.A. While Merila may have had a guilty conscience for parole 
violations, his actions were consistent with an innocent state of 
mind on the charged offense. Thus, with respect to the offense at 
issue, Merila had an innocent state of mind. 
The flight evidence here was not relevant to whether Merila 
willfully changed his residence on or about June 3rd. Crawford, 
201 P. at 1033 (when defendant fled, he was facing charges for 
another offense; thus, flight evidence did not support guilty 
conscience as to offense for which defendant was tried).10 
C. THE STATE ARGUES THAT WHERE FLIGHT EVIDENCE IS RELEVANT, 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS. HOWEVER, 
UTAH COURTS PROVIDE THAT IF FLIGHT EVIDENCE IS RELEVANT AND 
ADMITTED, IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS. 
According to the state, the flight evidence here was 
relevant to establishing the "mens rea element of [the charged] 
crime." (State's Brief at 31-32.) The state asserts that because 
the evidence was relevant, "there was no basis" for limiting 
instructions. (State's Brief at 32.) The state's assertion 
disregards Utah law. See note 8, supra. On the one hand, if 
evidence of flight is irrelevant it is inadmissible. Utah R. 
Evid. 402 (1998); see Point II.B.; Crawford, 201 P. at 1033. 
On the other hand, evidence of flight may be probative, and 
therefore relevant. See Franklin, 735 P.2d at 39; Bales, 675 P.2d 
10
 The state asserts at page 25 of its brief that "defendant 
conceded in his brief, under these circumstances the Utah Supreme 
Court 'reiterated that "flight" evidence was relevant and admis-
sible.'" (State's Brief at 25.) The state's assertion is 
incomprehensible. Merila did not concede that "flight" evidence was 
relevant in his case. He maintains just the opposite. 
16 
at 575. In that instance, it must be admitted with care and there 
must be balance to temper the prejudicial effects of the 
evidence. In criminal cases, where flight evidence is admitted, 
the trial judge should also [advise] the jury that (1) there 
may be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence, 
and (2) even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from 
flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the 
crime charged. 
Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l; Bales, 675 P.2d at 576 (recognizing 
that instructions provide balance when flight is admitted into 
evidence); Fisher, 748 P.2d at 205 n.l (evidence of flight "must 
be accompanied by specific instructions"). 
The state is asking this Court to rule that if evidence of 
flight is probative as to defendant's state of mind "there [would 
be] no basis for [cautionary] jury instruction[s]." (State's 
Brief at 30-32.) That argument is contrary to Utah case law. 
Franklin, Bales, Howland, and Fisher are controlling. The state 
has articulated no basis for disavowing the provision of 
cautionary instructions as set forth in those cases. The state's 
argument is flawed. 
The cautionary instructions are set forth verbatim in 
established Utah case law. See Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l; 
Bales, 675 P.2d at 576. Where evidence of flight is relevant, 
those cases urge use of the instructions to provide balance, 
making it a relatively simple task to present them to the jury in 
an appropriate, admissible fashion. The state does not dispute 
the prejudice Merila suffered as a result of the trial court's 
failure to provide the cautionary instructions. 
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D. THE STATE RELIES ON AN INAPPLICABLE RULE TO ASSERT THAT 
IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FAIL TO GIVE 
THE LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS AS DICTATED BY THE COURTS IN 
BALES, FRANKLIN, HOWLAND AND FISHER. 
The state relies on Rule 105, Utah R. Evid., to assert that 
it was not error for the trial court in this case to fail to 
provide the limiting instructions set forth in Howland and Bales, 
in connection with evidence of flight. Rule 105 states: 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for 
another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall 
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly. 
That rule is inapplicable here. 
Neither party in this case has argued that flight evidence 
was admissible as to one purpose but not admissible "for another 
purpose." In fact, the parties agree that if evidence of flight 
is relevant, it may assist in establishing state of mind with 
respect to the crime at issue. See Franklin, 735 P.2d at 39.11 
Further, the cautionary instructions at issue here do not 
advise the jury to consider evidence of flight as admissible in 
11
 The state's reliance on State v. Rocco, 795 P.2d 1116, 1119 
(Utah 1990); State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987), 
abrogated by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) ; and State 
v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1967), is misplaced. Those cases 
concern the admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rule 4 04, Utah R. 
Evid., which permits evidence of prior or subsequent bad acts to 
prove motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc., but not to prove a 
disposition to commit the crime charged. Rule 4 04 evidence, by its 
terms, is admissible for one purpose but not for another. The Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985), 
recognized that Rule 105 applies in the context of Rule 404 cases. 
The state has failed to cite to legal support for the 
proposition that Rule 105 is applicable in "flight" cases. 
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one context but inadmissible as to another. Rather, the limiting 
instructions, as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court, advise the 
jury to use caution in considering evidence of flight. See Bales, 
675 P.2d 575; see also Hgwland, 761 P.2d 580 n. 1. 
The state also reprimands Merila for relying on a footnote 
in Fisher, which provides that "in criminal cases, evidence of 
flight is circumspectly admitted and, if admitted, must be accom-
panied by specific instructions." Fisher, 748 P.2d 205 n.l. The 
state refers to the footnote as dictum and claims it is not con-
trolling. (State's Brief at 26.) However, in Fisher, this Court 
considered flight evidence. Id. at 2 05. It analyzed the rulings 
in Franklin and Bales, and recognized that "under the reasoning" 
of those cases, such evidence must be admitted with caution in 
criminal cases. Id. n.l. The directive in Fisher is not in-
cidental. Fisher relies on the reasoning of Franklin and Bales. 
In Bales, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when evidence of 
flight is admissible the jury should be advised that "there may 
be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that 
even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does 
not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged." 
Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. The instructions provide balance when 
evidence of "flight" is admitted. 
When the flight evidence was admitted in Merila's case, the 
trial court had at its disposal the reasoning of the Utah Supreme 
Court as set forth in Franklin and Bales, and this Court's 
reasoning in Howland and Fisher. The trial court was required 
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under established Utah case law to use care and balance in 
admitting "flight" into evidence; Utah case law sets forth 
verbatim the cautionary instructions that provide balance. The 
trial court's failure to properly balance the prejudicial effects 
with cautionary instructions constituted plain error. The state 
does not dispute that Merila suffered prejudice as a result of 
the error. (See Brief of Appellant at 29-31.) 
POINT III. THE STATE RELIES ON ITS MISSTATED FACTS TO ARGUE 
THAT THE PROSECUTORS REMARKS WERE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Merila maintains that the prosecutor's following remarks 
were inappropriate: 
[I]f Adult Probation and Parole had gone out at almost any 
reasonable hour [during the relevant time period] looking 
for [Merila at the West Valley City address], they wouldn't 
have found him because he wouldn't have been there. 
(R. 128:88.) The state disagrees and asserts the comments were 
supported by the evidence. The state bases its argument in part 
on its own mischaracterization of facts, as set forth at Point 
I.A., supra. 
Evidence shows that electronic monitoring agents went to the 
house on June 4th when Merila was looking for a job. They also 
went to the house on June 5th simply to pick up monitoring 
equipment. The parole officer and his partner were the only 
agents to go to the house for Merila on June 5th. They arrived at 
9:45 p.m. and stayed for 10 minutes. Officers made no other 
effort to visit the house. See Point I.A., supra. 
The state also asserts that Johnson told Vankatwyk that 
during the relevant time period "defendant came to her house in 
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the middle of the night, around 2:00 a.m. but only stayed for a 
couple of hours." (State's Brief at 28.) The state's assertion 
suggests Merila stayed at the house on one occasion. Yet Johnson 
testified that Merila lived with her during the relevant time 
period, and Vankatwyk acknowledged that he knew that fact. (R. 
128:44-45.) The state did not present evidence to the contrary. 
The prosecutor's improper statement was not a comment on the 
hours Merila kept at home. The misstatement went to the heart of 
the issue in this case: Whether Merila ate, slept, lived at the 
residence. Since the state failed to establish that Merila lived 
elsewhere, it was error for the prosecutor to allude to the 
existence of such prejudicial facts. State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 
781, 786-87 (Utah 1992); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah 
App. 1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
The state asserts that even if the remarks were improper, 
they did not prejudice Merila. According to the state, the trial 
court provided a curative instruction advising the jury that 
argument of counsel does not constitute evidence. The state as-
serts that "[w]hile the trial court did not [admonish the jury 
during closing argument], it gave such an instruction at the very 
beginning." (State's Brief at 29.) 
When the trial commenced, the judge advised the jury that 
the attorneys would make opening statements: "It's their 
opportunity to tell you what they anticipate the evidence in this 
case will show. They may be wrong. That's why you don't rely 
upon what they tell you necessarily." (R. 128:19.) The state 
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believes the early admonition should have stuck with the jury 
through opening statements, witness examinations, closing 
arguments and deliberations, and the jury should have translated 
the admonition to apply to counsel's closing argument as well. 
That is, in giving the admonition, the trial court focused 
on opening statements; it did not concern closing argument. 
At the close of trial, and prior to the misstatement, the 
prosecutor reminded the jury of the judge's earlier comments 
concerning opening remarks: "In the course of [my opening 
statement], as the Court has reminded you, I remind you again 
what I say is not evidence in the case, but rather the evidence 
is the testimony [you've heard and the documents].11 (R. 128:76-
77.) The prosecutor did not admonish the jury that it should 
rely only on the evidence and not on statements of counsel in 
reaching its factual conclusions. (Id.) 
Thus, the prosecutor set up a situation where he gave a 
limited admonition to jury members that failed to advise them 
that they should not rely on his statements in making factual 
determinations. The limited admonition was deficient. It 
facilitated the prosecutor in distorting the facts in closing 
argument. Contrary to the state's assertions, the prosecutor's 
limited admonition did not cure the prejudice. 
POINT IV. THE STATE RELIES ON EARLIER, FLAWED ARGUMENTS IN 
RESPONDING TO THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS. 
Merila has identified two instance where his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance: counsel failed to request 
cautionary instructions in connection with "flight" evidence, and 
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he failed to object to the prosecutor's improper statements. 
A. THE CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS. 
The state does not dispute that "flight" evidence comprised 
a substantial portion of the state's case and suggested guilt. 
The state does not dispute that there was no possible tactical 
reason for trial counsel to fail to request cautionary 
instructions.12 Rather, the state asserts there was no basis 
for the instructions because there was no evidence that was fully 
consistent with innocence. (State's Brief at 31.) 
As set forth above, the state's argument misunderstands the 
concept of having "reasons for flight fully consistent with 
innocence." See Point II.B., supra. Crawford and Utah "flight" 
cases do not require Merila to stand before the trial court with 
a clear conscience to support the determination that he had 
reasons for fleeing that were "fully consistent with innocence." 
Indeed, the concept requires just the opposite: the concept 
recognizes that a defendant may have fled because he had a guilty 
conscience for committing some other wrong. Crawford, 201 P. at 
1033; Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. In that instance, defendant's rea-
son for fleeing is consistent with having a guilty conscience for 
12
 Given the posture of this case, there is no conceivable 
tactical reason for failing to request the instructions. In some 
instances, counsel may not request limiting instructions in fear of 
highlighting evidence of "flight" and placing undue emphasis on it. 
That was not a concern here. Two of the state's four witnesses 
testified in detail to pursuing Merila. The reason for presenting 
the evidence was clear: the state wanted the jury to believe that 
Merila was fleeing because he had a guilty conscience for 
committing an offense. The state's message was not subtle. Since 
Merila was not charged with fleeing from arrest, the circumstances 
of this case make the cautionary instructions necessary. 
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the wrong, and consistent with innocence on the charged offense. 
The state also claims that "defendant's evasion of arrest 
necessarily reflected his actual guilt for absconding from parole 
supervision," making "flight" evidence all the more compelling. 
That argument is all the more reason for requesting the 
acceptable cautionary instructions. Contrary to the state's 
suggestions, Merila was not charged with absconding from parole 
by fleeing from arrest. Here, evidence of "flight" was presented 
in connection with a charge against Merila for "willfully 
chang[ing his] residence." Since evidence of "flight" sends a 
strong message of a guilty conscience, there must be balance to 
obviate the prejudicial effect. See note 8, supra. The jury must 
be cautioned that "there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt 
is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual 
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575; see also 
Howland, 761 P.2d at 580 n.l. The state's arguments are 
unpersuasive. Counsel's ineffective assistance prejudiced Merila 
as set forth in the opening brief on appeal. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
With respect to trial counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's misstatement, the state simply claims that because 
the statement was "supported by the evidence," there was "no 
basis to object." (State's Brief at 33.) The record disavows the 
state's assertion. See Point I.A. and Point III., supra. 
The record reflects that the state's case was deficient 
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where Vankatwyk and Johnson provided uncontroverted testimony 
that Merila continued to live at the residence. Since agents did 
not visit the home after June 5th, there was no way for the state 
to counter the evidence. Thus, the prosecutor made the misleading 
statement. Counsel for Merila was deficient since he failed to 
object.13 With respect to the state's claim that Merila 
suffered no harm here, Merila has addressed the prejudice issue 
in his opening brief on appeal (Brief of Appellant, at Point 
III.C. and Point IV.B.) and above, at Point III, supra. The 
objectionable statement was harmful to Merila's case. 
CONCLUSION 
Merila respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
conviction in this case for insufficient evidence, or remand the 
case for a new trial where the trial court committed plain error, 
and counsel for Merila provided ineffective assistance. 
13
 The state does not suggest that defense counsel had tactical 
reasons for failing to object. In the event this Court suspects 
such reasons existed, there is no basis in the record for the 
suspicions. Nothing suggests that defense counsel did not want to 
call attention to the damaging remarks, or that counsel sensed 
objections would prolong the case, as this Court proposed in State 
v. Haaa, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 21 (Utah App. 1998). For example, 
in Merila's case, if defense counsel had been concerned that objec-
tions would call attention to the matter or to the prosecutor, or 
that he would somehow garner antipathy from the jury for objecting, 
he could have requested a break following the prosecutor's closing 
and lodged the objection outside the presence of the jury. He si-
multaneously could have requested a curative instruction reminding 
the jury that statements of counsel do not constitute evidence, and 
the jury should not rely on such statements in reaching factual 
conclusions. State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah 1997). 
The record reflects that defense counsel gave the matter no 
thought. Further, as the prosecutor acknowledged to the jury, the 
case was moving right along at an efficient pace causing no concern 
for prolonging the matter. (R. 128:76.) 
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A I did. 
Q And about what time of the month did you receive 
that, do you recall? 
A Approximately toward the end of the month, around 
the 23rd. 
Q And what did that information relate to? 
A It was information as to the whereabouts of Mr. 
Merila and what he would be driving. 
Q To your knowledge, at that time was he being — 
you were attempting to find him? 
A To my knowledge, we were attempting to find him. 
Q And when you received that information, who did 
you pass that information on to? 
A I passed that information on to, I believe it was 
Paul Truelson. 
Q And he was the parole officer? 
A He was the parole officer at the time. 
Q Were you engaged or involved at all in subsequently 
looking for Mr. Merila based on that information? 
A I was. 
Q Do you recall the date that that occurred? 
A I recall it was on the 24th of June '96. 
Q Where did you go as a result of the information 
that you received? 




























'south and held surveillance on a place that Miss Johnson 
was supposedly working at at that time. 
Q Were you with another agent at that time? 
A As I recall, there were approximately six of us. 
Q And were you in a car with another agent? 
A I was. 
Q And who was that? 
A That was Agent Shannon Miller. 
Q And there were other officers in other cars? 
A There were. 
Q When did you first become aware of something 
happening? 
A Approximately around 4:30 that afternoon, we were — 
had information that she would be leaving work around five 
o'clock. 
Q Where were you located at that time? 
A I was located on the west side of 900 West in a 
parking lot approximately 150 feet south of the building. 
Q And what were you doing in that parking lot? 
A Waiting for the vehicle to — a vehicle that was 
described as to me, anyway, in the information, Ms. 
Johnson's car. It was a Dodge, I believe a Daytona, with 
Utah plates that was given to me. 
Q And did you see anything unusual at that time? 


























come take that back — he was going north and turned around 
and came back south, and that's when we fell in behind him. 
Q Where did he go then? 
A We followed him until he turned into the Flying J 
at 2100 South. 
Q What did you do then? 
A There was a car coming up — one of the agent's 
cars was coming up behind him. We pulled in front of him. 
He stopped and Miss Miller exited the car, had drawn her 
weapon, and asked at that time — ordered him out of the car. 
Q What happened then? 
A He looked at us both and then proceeded westbound 
out of the parking lot. 
Q What did you do then? 
A We attempted to pursue. Other agents had already 
pulled out behind us. We were behind another agent. We 
were just following them until we came into the area of where 
the car had apparently been dumped. 
Q So other agents eventually apprehended him and 
you were not there at that time? 
A I was there. We were in the process of surveilling 
the area of where we thought that he was. We were on 900 
West looking on the east bank of the river and then we were 
informed that he was apprehended on the west bank of the river J 
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A Prior to having apprehended him anyway. 
Q So is it fair to say that that would have been in 
the period between the 4th and 5th of June and the 25th of 
June when he was apprehended? 
A Yes, I knew that the warrant existed and I had 
asked her at one time; I believe that's when she told me. 
Q isn't it true that you had some objections as a 
family member that she was living with Mr. Merila, that you 
were concerned about that? 
A No, sir. 
Q You were not? 
A I was not. 
Q On the day that you saw Mr. Merila, was it at 
the Flying J; is that correct? The Flying J, is it a gas 
station there? 
A There's a gas station there. That was our first 
stop. My first sighting of him was when I was sitting in a 
parking lot west of — 
Q What were the lighting conditions like? 
A Daylight. 
Q It was daylight? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And did you approach Mr. Merila at all? 
A I did not. 



























A We observed the vehicle that we'd been told was 
















And which direction was he going in? 
He was heading south on 900 West. 
Now, were you still in the parking lot? 
At that time we'd moved to the next parking lot 
When you observed the vehicle, what did you do 
We left our position and pulled in behind the 
How close to the vehicle were you? 1 
Four or five car lengths. 
Was there anyone between you and that vehicle? 
I don't believe so, no. 
What happened then? 
We followed the vehicle down to the Flying J at 





And what did the vehicle do at that point? 
Turned into the parking lot of the Flying J. 
And what did you do? 
We turned left on 2100 South and into the parking 
lot of the Flying J, intending to place ourselves in a 
position 
Q 
to stop the vehicle. 







































I ordered Mr. Merila back to my side of the river. 
And did he respond? 
No. 
Then what did you do? 
I took off my service equipment and my wallet and 
the river after. 
Now, did he make it across the river? 
Yes, he did. 
And what happened then? 
When I reached the far bank of the river, Mr. 
was at the top of the bank. The bank was fairly steep, 
six , eight feet high, and then I got out of the river 
and followed him. 
Q 
A 
And where did he go? 
There was a mound of dirt or gravel there. He 










the tree and some brush. 
What was he doing at that time? 
Just standing there. 
What did you do? 
I ordered him to come out from behind and come over 
And did he? 
No. 
What happened then? 


























A There's a home there and he proceeded to walk around 
the northwest corner of that home. 
Q Then what happened? 
A I followed him around that and all the way around 
the house and back almost to where he was and found him kind 
of slumped down against the back of a tool shed. 
Q And then what did you do? 
A Placed him into custody. 
Q Now, how long was it before anyone else came to 
assist you? 
A Well, it was a mile before anybody came to my side 
of the river bank, but I took Mr. Merila back over to the 
bank near where we had exited the river and my partner 
was directly across the river from us. 
Q At that time did you have any handcuffs or anything 
on you? 
A Yes, I did, I had handcuffs. 
MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. I have no farther 
questions. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Jaenish? 
MR. JAENISH: Thank you, Judge. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JAENISH: 
Q You indicated that when you left the Flying J you 



























mention of it to my partner, Charles Adler. We continued on 
down California Avenue, 
Q Then what did you see? 
A We turned around, came back on California, and we 
saw Merila and another unidentified male suspect running north 
across California Avenue. 
Q Where did they appear to be coming from? 
A From the same direction that I saw the smoke earlier J 
Q What did you do then? 
A We parked the car, exited, entered the back of the 
residence in the backyard, through some brush, and then we 
came on to the Jordan River bank where Merila was about in the 
middle of the Jordan River trying to swim across. 
Q And did you observe Agent Adler then pursue him 
across the river? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you go across the river, or did you remain? J 
A I remained there. 
Q And then what did you do? 
A Well, we ordered him to come back. I just had 
my seapon drawn, maintained kind of a protection cover for my 
partner. Merila exited the bank, climbed up the bank, went 
around the mound of dirt where I lost sight of him. 
Adler went up the bank, around a dirt pile, and I 




























Q And did you also know that there were children 
in the home? 
A I would not know because I've never seen them at 
the house, at her house. I wouldn't know if she had 
[children live there. I know that my one sister who is her 
mother told me that she was taking care of the kids off and onJ 
Q Were you concerned that Mr. Merila was at the 
location where your niece was, where these children were 
'present? j 
A Somewhat. 
Q What was the nature of that concern? 
A The fact that there was a felony warrant out for 
his arrest. 
Q Did you have any knowledge of where Mr. Merila was 
living, other than with Ms. Johnson? 
A I did not. 
Q Didnlt you know for a fact that he was going to 
the house? J 
A I I did not know that he was going to the house. 
I think Ms. Johnson had told me at one time that he was 
going there, he might have been going there like at two 
o'clock in the morning and staying for a couple hours. 
Q And where did you receive that information? 
A I believe that was from Ms. Johnson. 



























A That's right. 
Q And yet you never said anything during that period 
of time? 
A My uncle was informed that he was staying with 
me still. 
Q You did what? 
A Harvey was still informed that he was staying 
with me still. 
IQ NOW, isn't it true that what you told Harvey, 
that he'd been there one or two nights and he'd come in very 
early in the morning? J 
A No, that's not correct. J 
Q What did you tell Harvey? 
A That he was staying with me at night, that he was 
still at home. 
Q That he was still there? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you sure? 
A I'm positive. 
Q Isn't it true that he was in and out and you 
didn't know where he was? 
A At times, but he was still living with me. He 
never did move. 
Q But you never did tell anyone other than Harvey — 
you're telling us that you told Harvey that he was there 
70 
previously placed under oath, took the stand and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHEPHERD: 
Q You've previously been sworn in this matter, Mr. 
Vankatwyk. 
You just heard the testimony of Jodean Johnson; is 
that correct? You were seated in court? 
A I did. 
Q And you recall having a conversation with Jodean 
Johnson in the month of June, and could you tell us where 
and when that conversation took place? 
A At — I was in my office and she was, I believe, 
at home. 
Q Was this on the telephone? 
A This was on the telephone. 
Q She is a person that you recognize her voice and 
know her? 
A I do. 
Q And do you recall the — approximately what the 
date was that you had this conversation? 
A It was in between -~ obviously it was during the 
time that the warrant was in existence, 




























A It did. 
Q And how did it come up? 
A I brought it up. 
Q And what did you say? 
A I just asked her if she knew where Mark was, that 
it would be in his best interests to turn himself in and just 
get it taken care of. 
Q And what, if anything, did she say? 
A She said, as I recall, "He's come and he's stayed 
here." That's the best of my — "He stays here but he doesn't] 
come until late at night," and I thought that the time was 
mentioned like two, around two in the morning. 
Q How long before you made the final contact with 
Mr. Merila was this? 
MR. JAENISH: I'm sorry, I didn't hear the question, 
Q (By Mr. Shepherd:) How long before he made contact 
with Mr. Merila was this conversation. 
A Approximately two, two weeks. 
MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. I have no further 
questions. 
MR. JAENISH: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr, Yankatwyk, you may step 
down, sir. Thank you. 
You now rest? 
MR. SHEPHERD: Yes. 
JLL 
